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Abstract: Findings from this study show that educational and mobility opportunities 
for families and students participating in the Chilean voucher system are not 
homogenously distributed. Some families and students use and benefit from the 
system, while others will remain marginalized. The quantitative results in this study 
demonstrate that students of relatively higher SES living in mid-high or mid-low 
poverty districts receive the benefit from vouchers. These students may move from 
one public school to another, from a public school to private-voucher school in the 
same area, from one district to another, or from a public school in an area to a 
private-voucher school in another district. Meanwhile, low-income counterparts 
living in high-poverty areas are excluded from the system and tend to remain at their 
public neighborhood school. 
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Política universal de vouchers en Chile: Comprendiendo su impacto sobre la 
educación pública municipal chilena 
Resumen: El presente estudio muestra que las oportunidades de movilidad educativa 
y elección de escuela de familias y estudiantes que participan del sistema de vouchers 
chileno no están homogéneamente distribuidas. Algunas familias y estudiantes se 
benefician del sistema, mientras otros se ven segregados o marginalizados. Los 
resultados cuantitativos de este estudio muestran que los estudiantes de clase media 
que poseen una posición relativamente más aventajada, y que viven en áreas urbanas 
de nivel socioeconómico medio-alto o medio-bajo, son quienes más se benefician. 
Estos estudiantes pueden trasladarse de un establecimiento educacional público 
(municipal) a otro, de un establecimiento público a uno privado (subvencionado) en 
la misma comuna, de un municipio o distrito escolar a otro, o de un establecimiento 
público (municipal) de una comuna a uno privado (subvencionado) de otra. Como 
contrapartida, los estudiantes de menor nivel socioeconómico, y que viven en las 
zonas urbanas de mayor pobreza, son quienes más excluidos están del sistema y 
quienes tienen las menores posibilidades de moverse y elegir un establecimiento 
educacional, por lo que permanecen estudiando en la escuela pública (municipal) de 
su barrio, altamente segregados y marginados, y sin generar vínculos sociales con 
otros. 
Palabras-clave: Vouchers; elección de escuela; Chile, educación en contexto urbano; 
privatización. 
 
Política universal de vouchers no Chile: Compreendendo seu impacto sobre a 
educação pública municipal chilena 
O presente estudo mostra que as possibilidades de mobilidade educativa e a escolha 
de escolas por famílias e alunos que participam do sistema de vouchers chileno não 
estão homogeneamente distribuídas. Algumas famílias e alunos se beneficiam do 
sistema, enquanto outras se veem segregados ou marginalizados. Os resultados 
quantitativos do estudo mostram que os alunos de classe média que vivem em áreas 
urbanas de nível socioeconômico médio-alto ou médio-baixo são os que mais se 
beneficiam. Esses estudantes podem se movimentar de um estabelecimento público 
(municipal) a outro, de um estabelecimento público a um privado (subvencionado) na 
mesma área, de um município ou distrito escolar a outro, ou de um estabelecimento 
público (municipal) de uma área a um privado (subvencionado) de outra. Em 
contrapartida, os alunos de menor nível  socioeconômico,  que vivem nas zonas 
urbanas de maior pobreza, são os que estão mais excluídos do sistema e os que têm 
as menores possibilidades de deslocar-se e escolher um estabelecimento educacional, 
tendendo a permanecer estudando na escola pública (municipal) de seu bairro, 
altamente segregados e marginados, como dificuldades para criar vínculos sociais 
com outros. 
Palavras-chave: Vouchers; escolha de escola; Chile, educacão em contexto urbano; 
privatização. 
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Introduction  
Voucher programs, which provide public funding for students to attend private 
schools, have become more popular in the United States in the last several decades. Such 
programs currently exist in six states (Florida, Maine, Ohio, Vermont, Utah and Wisconsin) 
plus the District of Columbia, enrolling between 650 and 13,000 students (Heritage 
Foundation, 2005). In addition, seven states (Arizona, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania) currently offer tax-credits or 
deductions to enterprises that offer scholarships to low-income students to attend private 
schools (American Federation for Children, 2011). Notably, a Louisiana voucher law was 
struck down as unconstitutional in May 2013 by the state Supreme Court (Strauss, 2013). 
While most existing voucher programs in the U.S. have been small-scale and targeted 
at low-income students (e.g. the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the Cleveland 
Scholarship and Tutoring Program, and the Washington DC program), there has recently been 
a push to expand programs to include students from middle-income families. For example, 
Florida, Indiana and Pennsylvania have considered legislation recently to either create new or 
expand existing school voucher programs for the middle class by loosening income 
requirements to apply (Cavanagh, 2011). 
The push to extend voucher programs rests on the assumption that vouchers will spur 
competition between public and private campuses, make schools more responsive to families 
and students, increase student achievement, and improve the effectiveness of all schools 
(Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962; Gallego, 2002; Gallego, 2004; Peterson, 2009; Sapelli & 
Vial, 2002). In addition, some researchers (e.g. Ladner & Brouillette, 2000) have argued that 
vouchers will improve school effectiveness by promoting competition between districts and 
between districts and private schools. A second assumption for supporting vouchers consists 
of the belief that vouchers will improve the educational opportunities of disadvantaged 
students (Sugarman, 1999), as well as contribute to their social integration with middle- and 
upper-class students. The argument is as follows: Since school choice is already available to 
upper-class families through residential mobility or through enrollment in private schools, 
expanding this right to low-income families through vouchers reduces stratification as parental 
income becomes less important in determining who attends private schools (Neal 2002, 
Nechyba, 2000). 
Contrarily, voucher opponents posit that scaling-up vouchers will result in “cream 
skimming” and greater stratification between and within the public and private education 
sectors (Bellei, 2009; Goldhaber, 1999; Ladd, 2003, Hsieh & Urquiola, 2004; Hsieh & 
Urquiola, 2006; Torche, 2005). As a result, some schools (those that enroll more able or 
higher-income students) will improve, while others will remain low-performing. Voucher 
critics also argue that similar “cream skimming” effects may be seen at the district level. 
According to Lubienski (2005) and Lubienski, Gulosino and Weitzel (2009), public school 
districts facing competitive pressures may respond like private organizations targeting potential 
consumers according to their hierarchical position in the market, rather than taking a more 
mission-driven approach of serving students in need. 
In debates around the expansion of voucher programs, however, there is little 
discussion in the U.S. about data and research from large-scale and/or universal voucher 
policies implemented elsewhere in the world. Chile, for example, has one of the oldest large-
scale, universal school voucher programs in the world, providing vouchers to all families and 
students in the country to choose to study at either public-municipal schools (public campuses 
administered by local municipalities) or private-voucher schools (private campuses that accept 
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vouchers given by the state and that can be religious or non-religious and non-profit or for-
profit). The existing system finances both school types based on their student enrollment and 
attendance throughout the year, giving the vouchers directly to public school districts 
(municipalities) or private campuses. 
Considering that many proponents of the choice movement in the U.S. are persistently 
seeking the expansion of vouchers, the Chilean system is instructive for voucher debates in the 
U.S. (and elsewhere) due to its immense scale and scope. Since its creation in 1981, the system 
has grown steadily, increasing enrollment throughout the years to the point that, since 1990, 
92% to 93% of students are included in the voucher system (only 7% to 8% of students attend 
private-paid independent schools that do not receive vouchers). Overall, the Chilean 
government has generated an expansion of student enrollment within the private-voucher 
sector from 33% in 1990 to 51% in 2009 at both primary and secondary schools (Larrañaga, 
Peirano & Falck, 2009a). In addition, there has been a 228% increase in the number of private-
voucher schools from 2,425 in 1990 to 5,545 in 2009 (both primary and secondary levels), 
largely within urban areas and cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.  
As a result, vouchers have resulted in steep enrollment losses in the public-municipal 
sector. Traditional public schools have seen a decrease in student enrollment from 59% in 
1990 to 42% in 2009, particularly at the primary level. In addition, the overall number of 
public-municipal schools has decreased from 6,000 in 1990 to 5,811 in 2009. Vouchers have 
closed public schools in Chile, mainly at the primary level, and within urban areas (Larrañaga, 
Peirano & Falck, 2009a). In sum, the Chilean government has fashioned a voucher system that 
has created universal choice. As a result, the Chilean case provides a useful “test case” for the 
impact of expanded vouchers on urban education in the U.S. and elsewhere.  
The main purpose of this research is to examine how Chilean municipalities have been 
affected by the threat of competition for students under the Chilean voucher system, and to 
test whether between-district stratification has been a relevant or irrelevant outcome of such 
pressures. More specifically, this study analyzes which key municipal factors (such as degree of 
private school competition within an area, municipal funds and resources available for 
education in a locality, socioeconomic demographics of municipalities and mean student 
achievement results for local public schools) are associated with municipal enrollment gains, 
retention or losses under the voucher system. Considering these goals, this study asks the 
following research question: What characteristics of urban municipalities in Chile —and in 
Santiago, the Chilean capital city— constitute significant factors that are associated with 
attracting, maintaining, or losing public school students over time at the district level? 
The Chilean Voucher System 
During the 1980s, the military dictatorship that governed the country between 1973 
and 1990, designed and implemented a large-scale, universal school voucher system. According 
to Carnoy (1998), this system was part of an overall “degovernmentalization” free market 
package involving both decentralization and privatization of the entire educational system. As 
a result of these trends, three distinct types of schools emerged: public-municipal, private-
voucher and private-paid schools. 
Education Decentralization 
Concerning decentralization, the reform transferred responsibility for public school 
management from the National Ministry of Education to local municipalities through partial 
devolution. This change implied new responsibilities for local officials, especially in terms of 
contracting principals, teachers and administering resources for school maintenance and 
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improvement. However, finance matters largely remained at the central level of the Ministry of 
Education, while pedagogical and technical issues remained at the regional and provincial 
levels. 
During the early 1980s, for aiming their new functions, municipalities created either 
Municipal Education Departments or delegated these responsibilities to a Municipal 
Corporation that administered both decentralized education and primary health functions in a 
more independent and flexible manner than Municipal Education Departments (Parry, 1997). 
Corporations were a popular choice among the larger cities, including most of the 
municipalities of Santiago Metropolitan Region, but the majority of localities had Municipal 
Education Departments. 
Education Privatization 
Prior to 1981, as in much of Latin America, Chilean school budgets were largely 
determined by the need to sustain an existing plant of teachers and facilities, and resources 
were mainly distributed among public schools. Then, as a result of a set of privatization 
reforms enacted in the early 1980s, school financial arrangements began to be determined by 
enrollment and overall attendance of students throughout the year, and resources were 
distributed in per-student same amounts among public-municipal and private-voucher schools 
(McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Parry, 1996). 
Chile had a tradition of public financial support of private education, mainly of 
Catholic schools, before the implementation of the voucher system in the 1980s. Prior to the 
reform in 1979, 82% of students attended public primary schools while 14% of students 
attended private-voucher primary schools (mainly Catholic). The remaining 4% attended 
private-paid independent schools. However, with its implementation, a large and increasing 
number of private-voucher schools started appearing, and these were not only religious or 
non-profit as before, but also for-profit schools subsidized by the state (Parry, 1997; Torche, 
2005). By 1982, only one year after the implementation of the privatization reforms, 73.8% of 
students attended public primary schools while 21.5% attended private-voucher schools (either 
Catholic or non-religious profit maximizing) and 4.7% attended private-paid schools (Carnoy, 
1998). 
Overall, school vouchers have generated a school system organized under three main 
types of schools: public-municipal, private-voucher and private-paid (independent) schools. 
Public-municipal schools correspond to public campuses which are administered by local 
municipalities, but which still depend on the Ministry of Education for both finance and 
pedagogical/technical issues. In general, these schools are free and open to all types of 
students, and tend to concentrate the enrollment of middle-low and low-income students. 
Larrañaga, Peirano and Falck (2009a) confirm this when reporting that, in 2006, 67% of 
public-municipal students belonged to families in the lower 40% of the income distribution. Is 
important to acknowledge that, under the voucher system, students living in any municipality 
can apply to any public school within any other municipality with theoretical chances of being 
accepted. However, public schools in better-off areas tend to attract and enroll families and 
students with better-off backgrounds (of higher SES or with more educated parents), while 
excluding low-income counterparts by setting admission criteria or by transferring students to 
other schools if they are retained in a grade (see e.g. Bellei, 2009). As a result, and as Elacqua 
(2006) has pointed out, relevant student enrollment and SES composition differences exist 
between public schools depending on the municipality. 
Private-voucher schools are private campuses that are subsidized by the state and that 
can be religious or non-religious, non-profit or for-profit. Consequently, and according to 
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Parry (1997), these schools can be run by nonprofit or voluntary organizations, trade 
associations, professional groups, religious organizations, cooperatives, or business firms, and 
usually accept better-off students (middle-income students or higher performing ones). 
Larrañaga, Peirano and Falck (2009a) confirm this when reporting that, in 2006, 52.6% of 
private-voucher students belonged to families in the upper 60% of the income distribution.  
However, and as Elacqua (2006) has indicated, it is important to point out, that depending on 
the specific subtype of school (religious or non-religious, non-profit or for profit), different 
student enrollment patterns could be found. As a result, relevant SES composition differences 
also exist between private-voucher schools. 
Finally, private-paid schools are private campuses that are paid directly and entirely by 
families and parents with no resources from the state. Due to their high costs, these schools 
are mainly attended by upper-class students. Larrañaga, Peirano and Falck (2009a) confirm this 
when reporting that in 2006, only 6.3% of private-paid students belonged to families in the 
lower 40% of the income distribution. These schools are the more homogenous ones within 
the Chilean education system. 
The Impact of Vouchers 
Notably, the impact of vouchers on students is still an open debate in Chile. A number 
of researchers in the U.S. have, in fact, examined the effects of vouchers on schools in Chile 
and have found that such systems have led to few improvements in achievement and increased 
stratification between schools (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; Carnoy & McEwan, 2000; Gauri, 
1998; Hseih and Urquiola, 2004; Hseih and Urquiola, 2006). For example, at the 
family/household level, increased between-school stratification has been explained as a 
consequence of the nature of parental choice, since parents through choice are likely to 
demand schools that emphasize the values of their social class (Parry, 1996). Elacqua, 
Schneider and Buckley (2006) indicated that this has been the case in Chile. Chilean parents 
have stated in surveys that they choose the school for their children based on school academic 
profiles, but Elacqua, Schneider and Buckley’s examination of the choosing process revealed 
that most parents considered this criterion only after they have chosen a set of schools with 
similar student demographics. 
Parental choice is not the only factor responsible for school stratification in Chile. The 
features of the voucher policy are also in play. Particularly, two policy measures have 
contributed to increased between-school segregation— student selection procedures and the 
charging of additional fees to parents through the implementation of the Shared Funding Law 
(Bellei, 2009; Gauri, 1998; Parry, 1996; Valenzuela, Bellei & De los Rios, 2006). These policy 
prescriptions allow all private-voucher schools and secondary public-municipal schools to 
select the students that are allowed to enroll in a school when there are more applicants than 
spaces available and to charge fees to parents on a monthly basis. 
Despite abundant evidence on stratification effects at the school level in the literature 
(Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; Carnoy & McEwan, 2000; Gauri, 1998; Hseih and Urquiola, 
2004; Hseih and Urquiola, 2006), few researchers to date have examined how the universal 
voucher system in Chile has specifically impacted the enrollment and social integration of 
urban school districts. Voucher proponents posit that vouchers will have similar positive 
competitive effects on school districts —or municipalities— as upon individual schools in 
urban areas (Ladner & Brouillette, 2000). However, voucher detractors posit that stratification 
will operate at both school and district levels. What does the evidence show? 
In general, studies of voucher effects in Chile have been analyzed at either the national 
(aggregate) or school (disaggregate) levels, and only few have considered how vouchers have 
Universal Vouchers Impact Urban School Districts’ Enrollment in Chile 7 
affected districts/municipalities (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; Hseih & Urquiola, 2004; Hseih 
& Urquiola, 2006; Larrañaga, Peirano & Falck, 2009b). In addition, to date, most of these 
studies have focused their analysis on the effects of vouchers on student achievement (Bellei, 
2009; Bravo, Contreras & Sanhueza, 1999; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Gallego, 2002; Gallego, 
2004; Mizala & Romaguera, 2000; Mizala & Romaguera, 2003; Sapelli & Vial, 2002), on 
between- and within-school stratification and segregation (Elacqua, 2006; Gauri, 1998; Parry, 
1996; Valenzuela, Bellei & De los Rios, 2006) or on a combination of both (Auguste & 
Valenzuela, 2004; Hseih & Urquiola, 2004; Hseih & Urquiola, 2006), and only few have 
focused their analysis on student enrollment, districts characteristics, districts responses to 
vouchers and voucher effects at the district level. 
A small number of researchers have pointed out that vouchers have had a significant 
impact on municipalities or districts in Chile, and even a fewer number have indicated that 
vouchers have affected different types of districts in distinct ways. For example, when 
analyzing student enrollment gains and losses over time among public-municipal schools at 
different localities, existing studies (Hseih & Urquiola, 2004; Hseih & Urquiola, 2006; 
Larrañaga, Peirano & Falck, 2009b; Raczynski & Salinas, 2009; Salinas & Raczynski, 2009) 
show that the flight of students from public to private schools, and between public-municipal 
schools, has not been homogenous across municipalities over time. Some local public school 
systems have lost more students than others under vouchers. Conversely, some local public 
school administrations have been benefited because better-off students living in surrounding 
areas have enrolled in their schools. These latter campuses are commonly known in Chile as 
Traditional Public Schools and correspond to campuses located in middle and/or high income 
areas that possess auras of historical prestige that persist in the current educational 
environment.   All these findings suggest that municipalities running and administrating public 
schools under the voucher system have obtained distinct enrollment results depending on their 
general characteristics and the specific competitive pressures they have faced within the 
“educational market.”  
Thus, in study we will seek to determine which municipal factors are associated with 
whether a public school district or municipality in Chile will attract and increase, retain, or lose 
enrollment over time, it is important to relate school enrollment outcomes to numerous 
potentially significant variables and determine which of these are significantly related changes 
in urban districts.  
Methods 
Main Hypotheses, Variables and Models of the Study 
Previous literature has suggested that relevant local/municipal variables affecting 
public-municipal school enrollment trends and stratification in Chile are: (A) municipality size 
understood as total population of a district, (B) the degree of private sector competition in an 
area (Hseih & Urquiola, 2004; Hseih & Urquiola, 2006), (C) the percentage of low income 
population in a municipality, (D) the percentage of low-income students enrolled in a district 
(Elacqua, 2006; Raczynski & Salinas, 2009), (E) student selection policies (Bellei, 2009; Gauri, 
1998; Parry, 1996), and (F) the charging of tuition or additional fees to parents (Bellei, 2009; 
Elacqua, 2006; Parry, 1996; Valenzuela, Bellei & Delos Rios, 2006). 
In addition to these variables, it is important to take into account other municipal 
dimensions or aspects in the analysis. According to Raczynski and Salinas (2009), it might be 
important to consider issues such as: (G) the rural/urban location of a municipality, (H) its 
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location within a city or region (near the city center or towards the periphery), (I) the average 
years of schooling of parents in a district, (J) the amount of funds and resources a municipality 
contributes to education as compared to its total revenue, (K) the municipal funds and 
resources available per capita in an area, (L) the total expenditures a municipality makes for 
paying education personnel wages and related fixed costs as compared to the total voucher 
received from the central government, (M) the percentage of educational funds available for 
things other than personnel salaries/wages (such as teaching and learning, instructional 
leadership, extracurricular activities, facilities maintenance and operations, etc.), and (N) the 
priority the mayor of a municipality assigns to education. Finally, two other relevant variables 
may be included in an analysis of vouchers in Chile: (N) the mean achievement results of 
public school students within a municipality, and (O) the municipality residents’ average 
income. 
Any of these variables might be considered when quantitatively analyzing the effects of 
school vouchers on public school enrollment trends and outcomes at the municipal level in 
Chile, particularly when considering which municipal factors have significantly affected those 
trends over time. However, due to data availability, parsimony, and simplicity, this study 
focuses on five main variables of interest— each aligning to a specific hypothesis of the study.i 
The hypotheses are: 
1) Municipalities with more exposure to competition from private schools in Chile will 
lose more students over time than less-exposed municipalities. 
2) Municipalities that contribute more financing and/or resources to education in Chile 
will gain or retain more students over time than lesser-contributing municipalities. 
3) Municipalities that receive insufficient vouchers from the central government that do 
not cover education personnel expenses and related fixed costs will lose more students 
over time than more solvent municipalities. 
4) Higher and mixed income districts—or municipalities—in Chile will gain or retain 
more students over time than low-income municipalities. 
5) Municipalities with higher levels of student achievement in Chile will gain or retain 
more students over time than low-performing municipalities. 
The statistical testing of these hypotheses is conducted using multiple linear regression 
(OLS) techniques. The dependent variable corresponds to the percent change of public school 
enrollment for municipalities in Chile between the years 2000 and 2009. The main independent 
variables correspond to eight municipal characteristics that are expected to have a significant 
effect on the dependent variable, by either to increasing or decreasing it. Three of these 
variables are controls, and the remaining five correspond to independent variables of interest 
linked to the hypotheses of this study.  
Specifically, nine OLS regression models are run, each introducing new independent 
variables (see Appendix, Table 6 for more details). Multicollinearity is addressed in each of the 
models by calculating and reporting the variance inflated factors, or VIF, of independent 
variables (see Appendix, Tables 10 and 11 for more details). The first model introduces the 
three control variables of the study:   
1) Municipality size understood as total population change of a district during a specific 
decade. (The percent change on the total municipal population 2001- 2009) 
2) Total student population change of a district during a specific decade (The percent change 
on the total student population of a municipality –including all types of schools- 2000- 2009) 
3) Level of urbanicity of a municipality, and/or the urban or rural location of a district. 
(The percent of urban territory of a municipality in 2009) 
Universal Vouchers Impact Urban School Districts’ Enrollment in Chile 9 
Model 2 introduces the first variable of interest: 
4) The degree of private sector competition in an area. (The percent change on the number of 
private-voucher schools within a municipality between 2000 and 2009) 
Model 3 adds a new variable to the previous regression equation:  
5) The percentage of funds and resources a municipality contributes to education as 
compared to its total revenue. (The percentage of municipal contributions to education compared 
to the total municipal revenue received in 2009) 
Model 4 replaces variable N° 5 with a new variable of interest: 
6) The total municipal expenditures on education personnel wages and related fixed costs 
as compared to the total voucher received from the central government. (The percentage 
of resources spent on education personnel wages compared to the total voucher received in 2009) 
Concerning the two previous variables, Larrañaga, Peirano and Falck (2009b) have 
indicated that the more the revenue contributions a municipality makes and/or receives for 
educating their public school students, the more the voucher received from the central 
government suffices for paying education personnel expenditures and related fixed costs. 
Thus, the more the education funds and resources are available for things other than paying 
personnel salaries/wages (such as teaching and learning, instructional leadership, 
extracurricular activities, facilities maintenance and operations, etc.), the greater the potential 
benefits for school improvement in an area. This study considers that similar effects unfold for 
districts when considering their capacity to attract enrollment: the more the education funds 
and resources contributed by the municipality and/or the more the funds available from the 
central government to pay education personnel expenditures and related fixed costs, the more 
the potential benefits for districts to attract students to their public schools. 
Model 5 adds a new variable to the previous regression equation: 
7) The SES demographics of a district. (The municipality poverty level for 2009) 
Hseih and Urquiola (2004; 2006) have pointed out that the socioeconomic 
demographics of a municipality, as well as the degree of private sector competition within a 
district, appear to be relevant factors for determining how vouchers will affect student 
achievement and stratification levels of local public schools. Particularly, they have found that 
the lower the income level of a district, and/or the more private school penetration within an 
area, the lower the tendency of the mean student achievement results for local public schools. 
We consider that similar findings may be found when analyzing public school enrollment 
outcomes at the local/municipal level: When either -or both- the percentage of low-income 
population and the private school penetration levels are higher, school districts –or 
municipalities- tend to experience a higher flight of students from their local public schools to 
other campuses, especially private ones.  
Model 6 replaces variable N°7 for an alternative achievement variable: 
8) The mean student achievement of public-municipal schools in an area. (The mean student 
achievement results of public-municipal schools in an area between 2006 and 2008) 
Concerning this last variable, and following the theory supporting vouchers (Friedman, 
1962; Ladner & Brouillette, 2000), it is expected that families having the option to choose the 
school for their children may prefer not only to enroll their children in schools where student 
achievement results tend to be better, but also in districts where the overall achievement is 
better. As a result, a district mean student achievement may also be a relevant variable to 
consider when analyzing the key municipal factors that explain which localities in Chile attract 
more students to their public schools. We test such assumptions and explore if other municipal 
factors (such as private school penetration levels, the amount of local funds and resources 
available for education, and the percent of low-income population in a district) work together 
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with a district’s mean student achievement for determining the potential attractiveness of local 
public schools. 
Model 7 introduces all variables (with the exception of variable N° 5). Model 8 replaces 
the municipal poverty level variable (N° 7) for dummy variables identifying different municipal 
poverty levels (high, mid-high, mid-low and low), and deletes variable N° 8, to see if effects 
vary depending on the level of local poverty. Finally, Model 9 runs the previous regression 
restoring variable N° 8 to the equation to see how a district´s level of poverty and its student 
achievement results combined with other factors to affect local public school enrollment 
outcomes. 
Methodological Limitations 
In general, the statistical methods performed allows obtaining valuable information 
about which municipal characteristics seem to be significantly associated with public school 
enrollment gains, retention or losses at the municipal level in Chile and constitute a relevant 
departure point for future studies on the topic and field. However, is important to recognize 
some methodological limitations in the research. 
First, when using simultaneous multiple regressions, the specific variables entered into 
the models may change the regression coefficients obtained (Keith, 2006). In other words, the 
introduction of additional variables or the replacement of a variable with another may change 
the regression coefficients attained. We recognize that there may be other student, district and 
school level factors that help to understand the impact of vouchers in Chile, such as the 
classification of student that changed school (low-SES, high-SES, has repeated a grade), the 
concentration of poverty in schools, the level of proximity between municipalities (since 
choice is not restricted to a municipality in Chile, inter-municipality competition may play a 
role in changes to enrollment), and the way in which the co-payment at private schools may 
have shaped the changes in enrollment.  As a result, inferences made from the regression 
analysis may be taken cautiously and further confirmed by future studies. In any case, it is 
important to remember that all variables included in the models have been considered in prior 
peer-reviewed voucher studies conducted in Chile.  
The second limitation is that the regressions performed in this study correspond to a 
cross-section analysis and not to a longitudinal one, which may mean that non-observed 
municipal variables that are constant through time, and that are not considered in the models, 
may have an effect on the results. Such a situation may introduce bias into the statistical results 
obtained preventing direct causal inferences between the variables considered in the models. 
A third limitation is that some of the independent variables used in the models could 
be considered either an independent or dependent variable of the main dependent variable of 
this study.  For example, the mean student achievement results for local public school obtained 
(SIMCE results) could either influence or be influenced by the public school enrollment trends 
experienced by a municipality. This statistical problem relates to the endogeneity of variables in 
OLS and the simultaneity bias. This limitation also prevents making direct casual relationships 
between independent and dependent variable(s) in the study. Instead, talking about association 
between variables is more appropriate.    
A final limitation is that the dependent variable corresponds to a percent change in 
public school enrollment between 2000 and 2009. This characteristic reduces the variability of 
the variable that could be increased if a raw indicator of enrollment is used. In addition, this 
characteristic prevents performing a time series analysis, which is a statistical procedure that 
could better control for biases in the statistical results obtained through OLS.  
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Overall, the limitations identified introduce various biases to the statistical analysis that 
prevent making direct causal relationships between independent and dependent variable(s) of 
the study. Nevertheless, results allow establishing association between these variables and 
constitute a relevant first step for understanding the municipal factors and characteristics that 
are related to public school enrollment changes –gains, retention or losses- across Chilean 
districts under vouchers. 
Main Findings of the Study 
The main purpose of this study is to understand how municipalities have been affected 
by the threat of competition for students the voucher system generates between public and 
private schools, and between public-municipal schools and districts themselves. To address 
this issue, this study focuses on analyzing the impact of vouchers on public school enrollment 
at the local/municipal level and examines what municipal factors are associated with 
enrollment gains, retention or losses over time. 
As discussed above, a shift has occurred in enrollment from public-municipal to 
private-voucher schools in Chile. This change has closed hundreds of public schools and 
financially hurt many public school districts, especially in urban areas. According to Larrañaga, 
Peirano and Falck (2009a), the loss of public school enrollment was particularly acute from 
2000 onward. Descriptive results of our study confirm this trend by showing that since 2006, 
the number of private-voucher students has surpassed the number of public-municipal schools 
in the country (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Nationwide student enrollment in Chile by school type (2000-2009) 
 
In addition, descriptive results from this research indicate that between 2000 and 2009, 
the enrollment of public-municipal schools has dramatically decreased at the national level, 
from 55% to 42%. In comparison, private-voucher schools have expanded from 36% to 51%, 
and private-paid enrollment has decreased from 9% to 7%. Additionally, Chilean municipalities 
have lost, on average, 22% of public school enrollment at the national level. Meanwhile, their 
private-voucher school enrollment has increased 38%, on average (see Appendix, Table 1).  
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Figures for the Santiago Metropolitan Area are even more illustrative of the change in 
the Chilean education system. Between 2000 and 2009, the enrollment of public municipal 
schools has dramatically decreased in the Metro Area from 39.8% to 30.8%. In comparison, 
private voucher schools have expanded from 46.6% to 58.5%, and private-paid enrollment has 
decreased from 13.4% to 10.6%. In addition, municipalities have lost, on average, 25% of 
public school enrollment, while their private-voucher school enrollment has increase 37%, on 
average (see Appendix, Table 2). 
This aggregated –national/regional- data obscures the heterogeneity of situations that 
occur among municipalities regarding its public school enrollment. Not all municipalities lose 
students equivalently; some lose a large percentage of public school enrollment, some 
experience smaller change. Notably, some municipalities across the country did actually 
increase their public school enrollment between 2000 and 2009 (see Appendix, Tables 3 and 4 
for more details).  
Considering these data, we conduct descriptive statistical analyses of Chilean 
municipalities including 345 districts that report information on school enrollment. From 
these, 29 (8.4%) lost more than 40% of public school students, 175 (50.7%) lost between 20% 
and 40% of students, 123 (35.7%) lost between 0.1% and 20% of students, and only 18 
municipalities (5.2%) increased their public school enrollment from 2000 to 2009. 
In comparison, from the total of 346 municipalities, 256 (71.9%) have private-voucher 
school competition within their limits. From these, 91 (35.5%) increased their private-voucher 
enrollment more than 40%, 50 (19.5%) increased their enrollment between 20% and 40%, 50 
(19.5%) increased their enrollment between 0.1% and 20%, and only 65 (25.3%) experienced a 
decrease in their private voucher enrollment. These percentages show that both public school 
enrollment losses and private-voucher enrollment gains have heterogeneously occurred across 
municipalities. In other words, the phenomenon of public school enrollment change –gains, 
retention or losses- under vouchers in Chile appears to vary depending on the main 
characteristics of the municipality and/or on the type of municipality to which we are 
referring. 
How Chilean Municipalities Vary and are cCaracterized: Descriptive Statistics 
For our inferential analyses, we consider eight main attributes; five of them correspond 
to the main hypotheses of the research and three are control variables. All of the attributes are 
expected to be significantly associated with public school enrollment trends and outcomes 
across time. This section provides a brief description of each of the independent variables both 
at the national level and within the Santiago Metropolitan Area (see Appendix, Tables 1 and 2 
for more details). 
First, municipalities vary depending on their total municipal population change for the 
period 2000-2009. Data reported show that, on average, the Santiago Metro Area has grown 
more than the overall country (13.7% versus 9.8%). However, extreme cases (with lower –
negative- and higher –positive- growth) are located outside the capital city. 
Second, districts vary according to their total student population change for the period 
2000- 2009. Percentages show that student populations within municipalities in Santiago and 
the overall country have decreased (-2.2% and -9.1% respectively), however, reductions have 
been higher outside the capital city both on average and considering the municipalities that 
have lost students. 
Third, municipalities vary depending on their urbanicity levels and/or on their 
urban/rural condition. Percentages indicate that municipalities in Chile have, on average, a 
relatively high level of urbanicity (62%). In addition, data reported shows that the average 
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percentage is higher for the capital city (87.7%). This means that most municipalities in the 
Santiago Metro Region are urban, and few have low levels of urbanicity. 
Fourth, districts vary according to the private voucher penetration they have 
experienced during the 2000s. Percentages indicate that on average private –voucher- school 
penetration was higher in Santiago than in the overall country (53.9% versus 31.6%). In 
addition, extreme cases (with lower –negative- and higher penetration) are also located in the 
Santiago Metro Area. 
Fifth, municipalities vary depending on the percentage of funds they contribute to 
education as compared to the total revenue they received in 2009. On average, such 
contributions were higher in districts located within the Santiago Metro Area than outside the 
capital city (8.6 thousand million pesos versus 7.09 thousand million pesos on average). 
However, the higher-contributor and lower-contributor districts are located outside of 
Santiago´s area. 
Sixth, districts vary according to the percentage of total expenditures made on 
education personnel wages and related fixed costs as compared to the total voucher received 
from the central government in 2009. Overall, the majority of municipalities in the country 
operate with insufficient vouchers, and they have to make contributions to cover the deficit. 
On average, this deficit is higher for districts located within the Santiago Metro Area than 
outside the capital city (39% versus 20% of deficit, on average); however, the districts that 
have the higher deficits are located outside Santiago, mainly in rural areas. 
Seventh, municipalities varied according to their poverty level in 2009. Percentages 
show that a great variation of poverty levels exists among districts in the country, and that the 
poorer districts are located outside of the capital city, mainly in rural areas (the average 
municipal poverty level is 16% in the overall country and only 10.7% in Santiago).  
Finally, municipalities vary depending on student achievement results (SIMCE results). 
Outcomes show that the average student achievement results of local public schools in the 
Santiago Metro Area are similar to, although slightly lower than, to the results in Chile (231.1 
points versus 234.8 points) however, the lowest scores are located outside of the capital city, 
mainly in rural areas. 
In sum, Chilean municipalities vary according to multiple characteristics. This study has 
taken eight attributes as main aspects to distinguish and differentiate districts. The overall 
picture is that variation rather than homogeneity is what predominates when comparing local 
areas. Such heterogeneity is a critical component for understanding the different public school 
enrollment trends and outcomes observed at the local/municipal level in Chile between 2000 
and 2009. As previously stated, public school enrollment has suffered a relevant decrease in the 
overall country during the period studied; however, this decrease varies depending on the main 
characteristics of the municipality and on the type of municipality to which we are referring. 
Which municipal factors are critical for understanding such variations?  
Factors Associated with Public School Enrollment Loss under Vouchers: OLS 
Analysis 
In order to determine which local/municipal factors are significantly associated with 
the gain or loss of public school enrollment in an area, a series of inferential linear multiple 
regressions (OLS) were performed that test each of the main hypotheses presented earlier. 
OLS allows considering both the joint effect and individual direct effect of various 
independent variables over the dependent variable while controlling for all the other 
independent variables (Keith, 2006). In comparison to independent sample T tests, the 
procedure allows testing the effect of multiple variables without the necessity of conducting 
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separate measures, which may inflate the chance of falsely rejecting some of the hypotheses of 
the study. In other words, by conducting multiple linear regression (OLS) techniques instead 
of separate independent sample T tests, the type I error is significantly reduced from the 
statistical analysis (Keith, 2006).  
The regression models performed explain between 30.4% and 43.7% of the variance in 
public school enrollment outcomes observed at the local/municipal level in Chile between 
2000 and 2009 (see Table 7). In addition, independent variables entered into the models do not 
show high variance inflated factors or VIF (see Appendix, Tables 10 and 11), indicating that 
multicollinearity is not an issue. 
 
Table 7 
R and R2 of Regression Models Performed 
Model R2 Corrected R2 Significance Level 
1 .310 .304 .000** 
2 .397 .390 .000** 
3 .398 .389 .000** 
4 .375 .36.5 .000** 
5 .369 .357 .000** 
6 .437 .426 .000** 
7 .427 .415 .000** 
8 .407 .392 .000** 
9 .453 .437 .000** 
 
Overall, regressions carried out allow establishing various significant relationships. A 
first finding from the OLS regressions performed is that the more exposure to competition 
from— or penetration of— private-voucher schools in a municipality, the greater the loss of 
public school students. This means that the first hypothesis of this study –municipalities with more 
exposure to competition from private-voucher schools in Chile will lose more students over time than less-exposed 
municipalities- is confirmed in the statistical analysis. Particularly, models 2 to 9 confirm the 
hypothesis (see Table 8). 
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Table 8  
Results of Regression Models Performed (Models 1 to 7) 
Model Variables/ 
Results 
 
Constant Percent 
change on 
the total 
municipal 
population 
(2000- 
2009).(DV) 
Percent 
change on 
the total 
student 
population of 
a 
municipality 
(2000- 2009) 
Percent of 
urban 
territory of a 
municipality 
in 2009 
Percent 
change on 
the number 
of private-
voucher 
schools 
within a 
municipality 
between 
2000 and 
2009 
Municipal 
contributions 
to education 
compared to 
the total 
municipal 
revenue 
received in 
2009 
Total 
Municipal 
Expenditures 
on Education 
Personnel 
Expenses 
over Total 
Voucher 
received 2009 
Municipality 
poverty level 
for 2009 
Mean 
student 
achievement 
results of 
public-
municipal 
schools in an 
area between 
2006 and 
2008 
1 Coefficient b -10.749 -.043 .479 -.102 - - - - - 
Coefficient 
Beta 
 -.098 .617 -.205 - - - - - 
Significance 
Level 
.000** .054 .000** .000** - - - - - 
2 Coefficient b -8.146 -0.29 .572 -.088 -.089 - - - - 
Coefficient 
Beta 
 -.066 .738 -.176 -.330 - - - - 
Significance 
Level 
.000** .170 .000** .000** .000** - - - - 
3 Coefficient b -7.299 -.031 .569 -.095 -.088 -.069 - - - 
Coefficient 
Beta 
 -.070 .735 -.190 -.327 -.025 - - - 
Significance 
Level 
.000** .154 .000** .000** .000** .577 - - - 
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Table 8 (cont.’d) 
Results of Regression Models Performed (Models 1 to 7) 
4 Coefficient b -3.142 -0.16 .530 -.086 -.085 - -.047 - - 
Coefficient 
Beta 
 -.039 .683 -.175 -.325 - -.102 - - 
Significance 
Level 
.269 .465 .000** .000** .000** - .032* - - 
5 Coefficient b .966 -.009 .496 -.076 -.085 - -.065 -.185 - 
Coefficient 
Beta 
 -0.19 .655 -.159 -.342 - -.143 -.112 - 
Significance 
Level 
.774 .733 .000** .001** .000** - .003** .018* - 
6 Coefficient b -70.350 -.008 .507 -.073 -.081 - -.042 - .279 
Coefficient 
Beta 
 -.017 .647 -.146 -.312 - -.087 - .273 
Significance 
Level 
.000** .749 .000** .001** .000** - .050* - .000** 
7 Coefficient b -63.626 -.006 .491 -.065 -.081 - -.053 -.110 .260 
Coefficient 
Beta 
 -.014 .645 -.133 -.330 - -.114 -.067 .262 
Significance 
Level 
.000** .796 .000** .004** .000** - .015* .147 .000** 
** Significant at.01 Significance Level  
* Significant at .05 Significance Level 
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This phenomenon is related with the fact that, in Chile, holding other factors constant, 
greater public/private school competition means greater public school enrollment losses for 
local areas. This phenomenon may occur within the country because many families see the 
movement of their children from a public to a private-voucher school as a source of 
opportunity and social mobility. This is congruent with findings of previous studies (Hseih & 
Urquiola, 2004; Hseih & Urquiola, 2006), which state that greater private school competition 
entails more losses than gains for local public schools because of the various comparative 
advantages private campuses usually possess over public ones (selecting middle class students 
and retaining out low-income counterparts, having a pool of more educated parents, receiving 
private donations, etc.), all of which transform them into more attractive campuses for the 
middle class within local areas. 
A second finding from this analysis is that the more insufficient the voucher received 
by a municipality for paying its education personnel expenses and related fixed costs, the more 
public school students that area will lose over time. This means that the third hypothesis of this 
study –municipalities that receive insufficient vouchers that do not cover education personnel expenses and 
related fixed costs will lose more students over time than more solvent municipalities- is confirmed in the 
statistical analysis. Particularly, models 4 to 9 confirm the hypothesis (see Table 8). 
In contrast, the effect municipal contributions to local public education have on public 
school enrollment is not significantly related with public school student losses –or gains- over 
time. This means that the second hypothesis of this study –municipalities that contribute more financing 
and/or resources to education in Chile will gain or retain more students over time than less-contributor 
municipalities- is not confirmed in the statistical analysis. Even more, evidence suggests that 
municipalities that contribute more Chilean pesos to local public education may lose more 
students in the period analyzed, although not significantly (see Table 8). Note Model 3 where 
regression coefficients for municipal contributions are negative and almost significant at the 
.05 level: Beta - .025, sig. level .577. 
The above findings could be related with the fact that, in general, additional resources 
provided by municipalities are not used for teaching and learning, management or educational 
investment purposes but for compensating the deficit that an insufficient voucher, one that 
does not cover education personnel expenses and related fixed costs, produces. Thus 
preventing municipal contributions from being used on items that add value to the service of 
education provided by the municipality. As a result, a greater availability of municipal resources 
for local public education in a municipality may not guarantee that public school enrollment 
will be increased or maintained. As important as the existence of such additional resources, are 
the purpose and destiny of such efforts. If those efforts are only used for compensating deficit, 
they won’t produce any significant difference. 
Another finding from regressions performed is that the poverty level of a municipality 
is not consistently associated with the loss of public school students. Whereas model 5 
confirms the relationship, model 7 rejects it (see Table 8). This means that the fourth hypothesis 
of this study – higher and mixed income municipalities in Chile will gain or retain more students over time 
than low-income municipalities- is not confirmed in the statistical analysis. 
In order to understand the previous finding, Chilean municipalities are grouped into 
four different clusters according to their quartile distribution on local poverty levels and tested 
on their differential effects over local public school enrollment outcomes (see Appendix, Table 
9 for more details). Groups correspond to high, mid-high, mid-low and low municipal poverty 
levels. The latter group corresponds to the reference category. Results indicate that districts 
with mid-high municipal poverty levels significantly lose more students than districts with low 
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municipal poverty levels (see Appendix, Table 9, models 8 and 9). In comparison, districts with 
high municipal poverty levels do not significantly lose more students than low poverty 
districts. Finally, findings for districts with mid-low municipal poverty levels are not conclusive 
(in model 8 coefficients are significant at the .05 level, but in model 9 are not significant).  
The above results can be interpreted as follows: The fact that the relationship between 
local poverty levels and public school enrollment outcomes only is significant for some 
municipalities –the mid-high municipal poverty levels ones- and not for others, may be related 
to how the Chilean voucher system functions and who it benefits the most in terms of both 
educational opportunities and student mobility. Previous researchers have demonstrated 
(Hsieh & Urquiola, 2004; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006; Torche, 2005) that student enrollment 
changes under vouchers in Chile have been mainly driven by middle class/higher ability 
students moving from their original public campuses to private ones –or to public schools 
located in wealthier districts. Meanwhile, low-income/less skilled pupils are still enrolled in 
their public neighborhood schools. These findings are coherent with results of the current 
study. Whereas previous research shows that middle class students have benefited the most 
and low-income counterparts have not, this study shows that greater educational opportunities 
and mobility have occurred for families and students living in mid-high poverty areas (and 
mid-low poverty areas to a lesser degree), but not for families and students living in high 
poverty districts. This means that educational opportunities and student mobility under 
vouchers are disparate not only for families from different SES backgrounds, but also for 
families living in different localities. In other words, in Chile, SES levels and place of residence 
should be coupled to determine differential educational opportunities and mobility for families 
and students under vouchers. 
Another finding that emerges from the quantitative analysis is that the higher the 
student achievement results of public schools within a municipality, the more the retention 
capacity of public school students in such area. This means that the fifth hypothesis of this study 
–municipalities with higher levels of student achievement in Chile will gain or retain more students over time 
than lower-performing municipalities- is confirmed in the statistical analysis Particularly, models 6, 7 
and 9 tend to confirm the hypothesis (see Appendix, Tables 8 and 9 for more details). 
The most interesting thing about this relationship is that the attraction and/or 
retention capacity of a public school in an area seems to occur not only due to its individual 
action but also as a result of the collective action of public schools in the area and the action of 
the municipality that administrates it. In other words, if the majority of public schools in a 
municipality obtain good student achievement results, most public schools in the area may 
benefit by diffusion (or hurt if results are negative). This effect could be related to the idea 
proffered by Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe (1995), who said that the predominant academic results 
of public schools in a district help to build the reputation of all public schools in an area. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that such an effect may not permeate low (or high) 
performing public schools, only average performing schools within a district. 
One last finding that emerges from the analysis is that the larger the urban territory of 
a municipality, the greater the loss of public school students (see Appendix, Tables 8 and 9). 
This significant relationship unveils that the Chilean voucher system has had a greater impact 
on urban areas, and that the greater public school student losses occurred nearby or within 
cities where student mobility across schools and across districts is easier. Despite the veracity 
of this finding, rural areas have also lost public school enrollment in the period analyzed, but 
such loss might be related to additional factors not considered in the current study, such as 
migration rather than the voucher system. 
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Summary of Findings of the Quantitative Analysis 
Overall, multiple linear regression (OLS) techniques carried out in this study find that 
four of the five hypothesis of the research are plausible and significant. Specifically, statistical 
analyses show that the higher the private-voucher penetration, the more insufficient the 
voucher received from the central government for paying education personnel wages and 
other related fixed costs, the lower the mean student achievement results of local public 
schools, and the higher the poverty level of a municipality, the higher the probability of losing 
public school enrollment at the local/municipal level in Chile. However, for some variables, 
effects over public school enrollment may not be particularly linear. That is the case of local 
poverty levels.  
When municipalities are compared to a reference category compounded of low poverty 
and wealthier districts, the loss of public school enrollment only is significantly higher for a 
specific group of Chilean municipalities: the ones that have mid-high levels of poverty (mid-
low poverty level municipalities also lose students but to a lesser degree). In comparison, high 
poverty areas do not significantly lose more students than low poverty areas. This occurs 
because school vouchers in Chile have opened greater educational opportunities to students 
with relatively higher SES, living in mid-high poverty areas. In comparison, the system has 
offered fewer educational opportunities to lower SES counterparts, living in low-income/ 
high-poverty areas. As a result, under the Chilean voucher system, not only family and student 
backgrounds are related to enrollment and educational opportunities. Demographics appear to 
couple with the specific social and economic characteristics and features of local areas where 
students live to determine the final educational opportunities and mobility they will be able to 
obtain from the system— both demographics and geography matter in the Chilean voucher 
system. 
Conclusions 
As said in the beginning, school choice promoters posit that vouchers will spur 
competition between public and private campuses, make schools more responsive to families 
and students, increase student achievement and improve effectiveness of all schools (Chubb & 
Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962; Gallego, 2002; Gallego, 2004; Peterson, 2009; Sapelli & Vial, 
2002). In addition, some researchers (e.g. Ladner & Brouillette, 2000) have pointed out that 
vouchers will prompt competition between school districts, and between districts and private 
schools, that will improve district effectiveness. 
Previous research on the Chilean voucher system has shown that these assumptions 
are questionable (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; Carnoy & McEwan, 2000; Gauri, 1998; Hseih 
and Urquiola, 2004; Hseih and Urquiola, 2006; Mizala & Romaguera, 2003). In general, 
empirical evidence suggests that student achievement, particularly the mean school 
achievement of a school, either public or private, largely depends on the student composition 
of the school and its mean SES. Furthermore, changes in achievement at the school level are 
significantly related to changes in the student composition of the school. Similar findings may 
apply at the municipal level; changes in achievement at the district level may strongly correlate 
with changes in the student composition of the municipality. 
The data in this study show that, in the midst of a universal voucher system, the 
competition has been won by private-voucher schools, at the expense of public-municipal 
schools. Between 2000 and 2009, enrollment in public-municipal schools has decreased at the 
national level from 55% to 42%. In comparison, private-voucher schools have expanded from 
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36% to 51%, and private-paid enrollment has decreased from 9% to 7% (see Appendix, Figure 
1). Additionally, Chilean municipalities have lost, on average, 22% of public school enrollment 
at the national level. Meanwhile, their private-voucher school enrollment has increased 38%, 
on average (see Appendix, Table 1). The universal voucher system in Chile has lowered 
enrollment and closed public schools across the nation. 
 
 
Figure 2. Santiago metropolitan area student enrollment by school type (2000- 2009) 
 
Urban public school enrollment in the Santiago Metropolitan Area has trended down 
more sharply than the nation as a whole (see Figure 2). Between 2000 and 2009, the enrollment 
of public municipal schools has dramatically decreased in the Metro Area from 39.8% to 
30.8%. In comparison, private voucher schools have expanded from 46.6% to 58.5%, and 
private-paid enrollment has decreased from 13.4% to 10.6%. In addition, municipalities have 
lost, on average, 25% of public school enrollment, while their private-voucher school 
enrollment has increase 37%, on average (see Appendix, Table2). 
In addition, the statistical analyses performed in this study shows that Chilean 
municipalities have not lost public school students in the same manner, as some have lost 
more students than others due to heterogeneity between districts. On the one hand, a high 
private-voucher penetration within a locality, an insufficient voucher received from the central 
government for paying education personnel wages, fixed costs and low mean student 
achievement results for local public schools are associated with public school enrollment losses 
at the local/municipal level in Chile. On the other hand, a low private voucher penetration, 
sufficient voucher resources received from the central government and high mean student 
achievement results for local public schools are associated with public school enrollment gains 
or stability within a locality.  
Concerning the effect of municipal local poverty levels over public school enrollment, 
findings are more complex. Despite the fact that low poverty areas are the localities that tend 
to retain more public school students on their campuses, high poverty areas are not the 
localities that tend to lose more public school students. Mid-high poverty areas and mid-low 
poverty areas, to a lesser degree, are the greater losers of public school enrollment. Why is this 
the case? First, the retention of students at low poverty and wealthier districts may relate to the 
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high status and historical prestige they possess, along with the implementation of some 
practices that keep their local status untouched: The selection of the best students from the 
pool of applicants, the management of the number of students with behavioral problems they 
have, the expulsion of most conflictive students when necessary, and the investment in school 
infrastructure and appearance, etc. These practices are similar to the ones that most private-
voucher schools put in practice and differ from the measures other public school districts are 
able to implement (Author, 2014). 
Second, high poverty districts are not the highest losers of public school enrollment 
under vouchers in Chile because their students appear unattractive to private providers or to 
municipalities in better-off areas. In addition, families of students in high-poverty districts do 
not have sufficient resources to pay for transportation costs or for the additional fees private-
voucher schools usually charge. As a result, the students tend to remain studying in their public 
neighborhood schools and become “ghettoized” from the system (see Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe 
[1995] for similar findings under open school choice in England). 
Finally, mid-high poverty municipalities –and mid-low poverty areas to a lesser degree- 
appear to be losing public school students the most. This finding may be related to the “higher 
spectrum of opportunities” students living in these areas will have to choose from— a specific 
campus or a set of schools— as compared the limited choices of students living in high-
poverty districts. These higher opportunities occur because families and students living in 
mixed income areas, who also have a relatively higher SES, are the ones that can access, pay 
for and/or get selected by either private-voucher schools or public schools in better-off areas. 
This is an important area for future research. 
In sum, findings from this study show that educational and mobility opportunities for 
families and students participating in the Chilean voucher system are not homogenously 
distributed. Some families and students will use and benefit from the system, while others will 
remain marginalized. Who will be able to benefit from the system and who are the losers? 
Based on quantitative results from this research, students of relatively higher SES living in mid-
high –or mid-low- poverty districts receive the benefit from vouchers. These students may 
move from one public school to another, from a public school to private-voucher school in 
the same area, from one district to another, or from a public school in an area to a private-
voucher school in another district. Meanwhile, low-income counterparts living in high-poverty 
areas are excluded from the system and tend to remain at their public neighborhood school 
(see also Author, 2014).   
Policy Implications 
Considering previous elaborations, what can be learned from this study? What main 
policy implications unfold about the design, implementation and/or effects of large scale, 
universal school voucher plans, like the Chilean one? How could public education thrive in the 
context of increased education privatization? The first policy implication from this study is that 
the consideration of district level characteristics is relevant when analyzing the effects of large 
scale, universal school voucher plans. The effects of vouchers not only vary depending on 
school or school sector –public or private- characteristics, but also on district attributes. For 
example, this study demonstrates that, within urban areas, the level of poverty of a 
municipality –or district- matters for retaining/attracting students to the locality in the context 
of open school choice. Similarly, the mean student performance of local public schools also 
affects a public district’s ability to retain/attract students. From a broader perspective, this 
implies that the analysis of the effects of market mechanisms on an educational system and on 
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public education needs to incorporate the district/municipal level along with other –more 
traditional- levels, such as the school and the school sector for an empirically, rather than 
ideologically, driven approach to vouchers. 
A second policy implication from this research is that the claim of voucher supporters 
that school vouchers will prompt school competition –and district level competition- thereby 
increasing the overall effectiveness of the educational system is questionable. It appears to 
depend on how competition unfolds, if this outcome becomes more possible under vouchers 
than under a more traditional educational system. In the Chilean case, competition has 
certainly not increased such effectiveness. On one hand, previous research (Auguste & 
Valenzuela, 2004; Carnoy & McEwan, 2000; Gauri, 1998; Hseih and Urquiola, 2004; Hseih and 
Urquiola, 2006; Mizala & Romaguera, 2003) has demonstrated that increased overall student 
achievement has not been obtained as a result of the introduction of vouchers. On the other 
hand, this study shows that competition for students has not strengthened either the public or 
the private-voucher sector, but downgraded the public and benefited the private terms of 
enrollment. This outcome has been the result of how the Chilean voucher system functions.  
The third, and perhaps most important, policy implication from this study is that the 
design and implementation of a large scale, universal school voucher plan may imply various 
unintended negative effects over equity of education opportunity and the social integration of 
students within an education system. Such inequities not only operate between schools and 
school sectors, but also between districts. Chile has recognized the inequity for low-SES 
students as a problem in their market-based approach and, in 2008, passed the Preferential 
Subvention Law (PSL), changing the apportionment of the voucher. Prior to the PSL, the 
voucher amount was the same for all students. The new law created a larger voucher for high-
poverty students. The data in the study are prior to the passage of the PSL. Future research is 
necessary to understand if the newly allotted amounts are enough for suppliers (schools) in the 
market to be interested in consumers (low-SES students). Thus, another question for future 
research is whether these newly allotted amounts balance the market in favor of low-SES 
students, particularly for those living in mid- high and high poverty areas. Whether the PSL has 
changed the attraction and retention of low-SES students is still an open question. 
This study demonstrates that, in a voucher market where the voucher is distributed 
equally, the final result is a complex scenario of education stratification where differences and 
segregation simultaneously occur across different lines. Not only between public school A and 
public school B, but also between public schools A and B, and private-voucher school C in the 
same neighborhood. Not also between public school A and B and private-voucher school C, 
but also between them and private-voucher school D located in a nearby area. Not only 
between public school district A and public school district B, but also between public school 
districts A and B, and private-voucher schools located in both districts, etc. In a market based 
educational system, all these possibilities introduce uncertainty to school enrollment. Prior 
research on vouchers in Chile, and the current study, demonstrate that specific family and 
student characteristics, as well as, the family/student´s area of residence will jointly determine 
the spectrum of educational opportunities available in a universal voucher system. 
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APPENDIX: 
QUANTITATIVE DATA & RESULTS 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Continuous Independent Variables of the Study: Municipalities at the 
National level 
NATIONAL LEVEL N Minimum Maximum Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Public-municipal enrollment change 
2000- 2009 (DV) 
345 -73.84 58.78 -22.0072 15.07414 
Private-voucher enrollment change 
2000- 2009 
346 -87.50 1160.42 38.5804 100.16432 
Municipality Total Population Change 
2001- 2009 (IV) 
341 -67.01 239.53 9.8579 34.15191 
Total Student Population Change 
2000- 2009 (IV) 
344 -70.25 125.05 -9.1486 19.19986 
Urbanicity Level: Percent of Urban 
Population 2009 (IV) 
345 .00 100 62.0827 30.02525 
Percent Change of Private-voucher 
Schools 2000- 2009 (IV) 
346 -50.00 350.00 31.6833 55.72258 
Municipality Contributions to 
Education from Total Municipal 
Revenue 2009 (IV) 
339 .00 26.13 7.0969 5.43513 
Total Municipal Expenditures on 
Education Personnel Expenses over 
Total Voucher received 2009 (IV) 
335 57.71 294.89 120.4220 31.00560 
Poverty Index CASEN Survey 2009 
(IV) 
335 1.4 50.9 16.033 8.5408 
SIMCE Language Math Public-
municipal 2006- 2008 (IV) 
339 195.00 302.09 234.8338 14.47745 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Continuous Independent Variables of the Study: Municipalities within 
the Santiago Metropolitan Area 
SANTIAGO METROPOLITAN 
AREA 
N Minimum Maximum Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Public-municipal enrollment change 
2000- 2009 (DV) 
52 -51.90 11.24 -25.0328 14.55049 
Private-voucher enrollment change 
2000- 2009 
52 -46.33 348.76 37.3990 81.36792 
Municipality Total Population Change 
2001- 2009 (IV) 
52 -25.08 236.97 13.7236 43.67924 
Total Student Population Change 
2000- 2009 (IV) 
52 -34.66 125.05 -2.2851 27.85642 
Urbanicity Level: Percent of Urban 
Population 2009 (IV) 
51 .00 100 87.7898 22.02608 
Percent Change of Private-voucher 
Schools 2000- 2009 (IV) 
52 -50.00 350.00 53.9615 82.55241 
Municipality Contributions to 
Education from Total Municipal 
Revenue 2009 (IV) 
52 2.67 21.89 8.6390 4.79363 
Total Municipal Expenditures on 
Education Personnel Expenses over 
Total Voucher received 2009 (IV) 
51 94.31 213.74 139.4827 28.27875 
Poverty Index CASEN Survey 2009 
(IV) 
52 2.3 21.4 10.750 4.8271 
SIMCE Language Math Public-
municipal 2006- 2008 (IV) 
52 208.24 302.09 231.1780 18.67360 
 
Table 3  
Chilean Nationwide School Enrollment Losses: Public-municipal versus Private voucher 
LOSSES: Percent Change Public-municipal Sector Private-voucher Sector 
More than -40% (N) 29 8 
Between -20% and -40% (N) 175 17 
Between -0.1% and -20% (N) 123 40 
Subtotal 327 65 
Total 345 256 
  
Table 4  
Chilean Nationwide School Enrollment Gains: Public-municipal versus Private-voucher 
GAINS: Percent Change Public-municipal Sector Private-voucher Sector 
More than +40% (N) 2 91 
Between +20% and +40% 
(N) 
2 50 
Between +0.1% and +20% 
(N) 
14 50 
Subtotal 18 191 
Total 345 256 
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Table 5  
Correlation of Dependent and Continuous Independent Variables of the Study 
 Public 
School 
Enrollment 
Change 
2000- 2009 
(DV) 
Poverty 
Index 
CASEN 
Survey 
2009 
(IV) 
Municipality 
Contributio
ns to 
Education 
from Total 
Municipal 
Revenue 
2009 (IV) 
Total 
Municipal 
Expenditures 
on Education 
Personnel 
Expenses 
over Total 
Voucher 
received 2009 
(IV) 
 
SIMCE 
Language 
Math Public-
municipal 
2006- 2008 
(IV) 
Percent 
Change of 
Private-
voucher 
Schools 2000- 
2009 (IV) 
Municipalit
y Total 
Population 
Change 
2001- 2009 
(IV) 
Total 
Student 
Populatio
n Change 
2000- 
2009 (IV) 
Urbanicity 
Level: Percent 
of Urban 
Population 
2009 (IV) 
Public School 
Enrollment Change 
2000- 2009 (DV) 
1 -.080 
Sig .144 
-.074 
Sig .176 
-.167** 
Sig .002 
.264** 
Sig .000 
-.089 
Sig .100 
.170** 
Sig .002 
.518** 
Sig .000 
-.056 
Sig .296 
Poverty Index 
CASEN Survey 
2009 (IV) 
-.080 
Sig .144 
1 -.017 
Sig .763 
-.257** 
Sig .000 
-.174** 
Sig .001 
-.108* 
Sig .048 
-.218** 
Sig .000 
-.127* 
Sig .021 
-.103 
Sig .060 
Municipality 
Contributions to 
Education from 
Total Municipal 
Revenue 2009 (IV) 
-.074 
Sig .176  
-.017 
Sig .763 
1 .331** 
Sig .000 
.017 
Sig .752 
-.047 
Sig .385 
.126* 
Sig .021 
-.143** 
Sig. 008 
-.231** 
Sig .000 
Total Municipal 
Expenditures on 
Education 
Personnel Expenses 
over Total Voucher 
received 2009 (IV) 
-.167** 
Sig .000 
-.257** 
Sig .000 
.331** 
Sig .000 
1 -.041 
Sig .463 
.031 
Sig .571 
.273** 
Sig .000 
-.037 
 Sig .495 
.127* 
Sig .020 
SIMCE Language 
Math Public-
municipal 2006- 
2008 (IV) 
.264** 
Sig .000 
-.174** 
Sig .001 
.017 
Sig .752 
-.041 
Sig .463 
1 -.079 
Sig .145 
-.051 
Sig .352 
-.040 
Sig .469 
-.139 
Sig .011 
Percent Change of 
Private-voucher 
Schools 2000- 2009 
(IV) 
-.089 
Sig .100 
-.108* 
Sig .048 
-.047 
Sig .385 
.031 
Sig .571 
-.079 
Sig .145 
1 .262** 
Sig .000 
.431** 
Sig .000 
.204**  
Sig .000 
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Table 5 (cont.’d) 
Correlation of Dependent and Continuous Independent Variables of the Study 
Municipality 
Total 
Population 
Change 2001- 
2009 (IV) 
.170** 
Sig .002 
-.218** 
Sig .000 
.126 
Sig .021 
.273** 
Sig .000 
-.051 
Sig .352 
.262** 
Sig .000 
1 .444** 
Sig .000 
.026 
Sig .632 
Total Student 
Population 
Change 2000- 
2009 (IV) 
.518** 
Sig .000 
-.127* 
Sig .021 
-.143** 
Sig .008 
-.037 
Sig .495 
-.040 
Sig .469 
.431** 
Sig .000 
.444** 
Sig .000 
1 .269** 
Sig .000 
Urbanicity 
Level: Percent 
of Urban 
Population 2009 
(IV) 
-.056 
Sig .296 
-.103 
Sig .060 
-.231** 
Sig .000 
.127* 
Sig .020 
-.139* 
Sig .011 
.204** 
Sig .000 
.026 
Sig .632 
.269** 
Sig .000 
1 
** Significant at .01 Significance Level  
* Significant at .05 Significance Level 
Table 6  
Description of Regression Models Performed 
Models Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
1 MODEL 1 INCLUDES THREE VARIABLES (a, b and c) IN THE REGRESSION 
EQUATION: 
a) The percent change on the total municipal population (2000- 2009).
b) The percent change on the total student population of a municipality –
including all types of schools- (2000- 2009).
c) The percent of urban territory of a municipality in 2009 (as measured by
SINIM).
a) Percent change on
public school
enrollment at the
municipal level (2000-
2009) 
2 MODEL 2 ADDS A NEW VARIABLE (d) TO THE REGRESSION EQUATION: 
d) The percent change on the number of private-voucher schools within a
municipality between 2000 and 2009. 
Idem 
3 MODEL 3 ADDS A NEW VARIABLE (e) TO THE REGRESSION EQUATION: 
e) The percentage of municipal contributions to education compared to the total
municipal revenue received in 2009 (as measured by SINIM). 
Idem 
4 MODEL 4 REPLACES VARIABLE e) WITH A NEW VARIABLE f): 
f) Total Municipal Expenditures on Education Personnel Expenses over Total
Voucher received 2009 (as measured by SINIM). 
Idem 
5 MODEL 5 ADDS A NEW VARIABLE (g) TO THE REGRESSION EQUATION: 
g) The municipality poverty level for 2009 (as measured by the CASEN survey).
Idem 
6 MODEL 6 ADDS A NEW VARIABLE TO THE REGRESSION EQUATION (h), 
AND DELETES VARIABLE g): 
h) The mean student achievement results of public-municipal schools in an area
between 2006 and 2008 (as measured by SIMCE). 
Idem 
7 MODEL 7 CONTAINS ALL PREVIOUS VARIABLES (except variable e), 
AND INCLUDES BOTH VARIABLES g) AND h). 
Idem 
8 MODEL 7 REPLACES VARIABLE g) FOR DUMMY VARIABLES ON 
POVERTY LEVELS, AND DELETES VARIABLE h): 
i) Dummy variables for the municipality poverty level for 2009 (High, Mid-High,
Mid-Low Poverty Levels, and Low Poverty Level as reference category) 
Idem 
9 MODEL 8 CONTAINS SAME VARIABLES AS MODEL 7 AND ADDS 
VARIABLE h) TO THE REGRESSION EQUATION. 
Idem 
Universal Vouchers Impact Urban School Districts’ Enrollment in Chile 33 
Table 9 
Results of Regression Models with Dummy Variables on Municipal Poverty Levels (Models 8 and 9) 
Model Constant Percent 
change on 
the total 
municipal 
population 
(2000- 
2009) 
Percent 
change on 
the total 
student 
population 
of a 
municipality 
(2000- 
2009). 
Percent of 
urban 
territory of a 
municipality 
in 2009 
Percent 
change on 
the number 
of private-
voucher 
schools 
within a 
municipality 
between 
2000 and 
2009 
Total 
Municipal 
Expenditures 
on Education 
Personnel 
Expenses 
over Total 
Voucher 
received 2009 
Mid-Low 
Municipal 
Poverty 
Level- 
Dummy 
Variable 
Mid-High 
Municipal 
Poverty 
Level- 
Dummy 
Variable 
High 
Municipal 
Poverty 
Level- 
Dummy 
Variable 
Mean 
student 
achievement 
results of 
public-
municipal 
schools in an 
area between 
2006 and 
2008 
8 Coefficient b 1.260 -.021 .516 -.079 -.083 -.059 -3.461 -7.374 -3.429 - 
Coefficient 
Beta 
-.050 .664 -.162 -.317 -.127 -.104 -.220 -.101 - 
Significance 
Level 
.691 .333 .000** .000** .000** .007** .050* .000** .065 - 
9 Coefficient b -60.948 -.010 .498 -.070 -.080 -.051 -2.341 -5.297 -2.307 .252 
Coefficient 
Beta 
-.021 .636 -.139 -.309 -.106 -.071 -.158 -.068 .247 
Significance 
Level 
.000** .686 .000** .002** .000** .019* .173 .003** .200 .000** 
** Significant at.01 Significance Level 
* Significant at .05 Significance Level
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Table 10  
Diagnostics for Multicollinearity (Models 1 to 7) 
Model Variables/ 
Results 
Percent 
change on the 
total 
municipal 
population 
(2000- 2009) 
Percent 
change on the 
total student 
population of 
a municipality 
(2000- 2009) 
Percent of 
urban territory 
of a 
municipality in 
2009 
Percent 
change on the 
number of 
private-
voucher 
schools within 
a municipality 
between 2000 
and 2009 
Municipal 
contributions to 
education 
compared to the 
total municipal 
revenue 
received in 2009 
Total Municipal 
Expenditures on 
Education 
Personnel 
Expenses over 
Total Voucher 
received 2009 
Municipality 
poverty level 
for 2009 
Mean student 
achievement 
results of 
public-
municipal 
schools in an 
area between 
2006 and 2008 
1 Tolerance .793 .733 .913 - - - - - 
VIF 1.261 1.363 1.095 - - - - - 
2 Tolerance .785 .654 .905 .799 - - - - 
VIF 1.273 1.530 1.105 1.251 - - - - 
3 Tolerance .758 .640 .873 .793 .899 - - - 
VIF 1.318 1.562 1.145 1.261 1.113 - - - 
4 Tolerance .697 .627 .882 .788 - .863 - - 
VIF 1.463 1.596 1.134 1.269 - 1.158 - - 
5 Tolerance .624 .550 .882 .775 - .857 .897 - 
VIF 1.603 1.818 1.134 1.290 - 1.167 1.115 - 
6 Tolerance .650 .591 .890 .788 - .899 - .977 
VIF 1.538 1.692 1.123 1.269 - 1.113 - 1.024 
7 Tolerance .614 .554 .879 .775 - .837 .867 .948 
VIF 1.627 1.807 1.138 1.291 - 1.195 1.154 1.055 
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Table 11 
Diagnostics for Multicollinearity (Models 8 and 9) 
Model Percent 
change on 
the total 
municipal 
population 
(2000- 
2009). 
Percent change 
on the total 
student 
population of a 
municipality 
(2000- 2009). 
Percent of 
urban territory 
of a 
municipality in 
2009. 
Percent 
change on 
the number 
of private-
voucher 
schools 
within a 
municipality 
between 
2000 and 
2009. 
Municipal 
contributions 
to education 
compared to 
the total 
municipal 
revenue 
received in 
2009 
Mid-Low 
Municipal 
Poverty 
Level- 
Dummy 
Variable 
Mid-High 
Municipal 
Poverty 
Level- 
Dummy 
Variable 
High 
Municipal 
Poverty 
Level- 
Dummy 
Variable 
Mean student 
achievement 
results of 
public-
municipal 
schools in an 
area between 
2006 and 2008 
8 Tolerance .687 .618 .871 .780 .826 .662 .656 .625 - 
VIF 1.456 1.618 1.148 1.281 1.211 1.512 1.526 1.599 - 
9 Tolerance .641 .581 .881 .782 .857 .644 .628 .612 .936 
VIF 1.559 1.721 1.136 1.280 1.167 1.554 1.592 1.633 1.068 
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